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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
proved, it would seem that intrabrand restrictions would become less
important to the franchisees and eventually could be lifted.
Sealy adds a new dimension to the law of antitrust because it is
the first case in which the agreements of firms with little market
power to divide territory have been found unlawful.2" Yet because
the Court used the presence of price fixing to find the agreements per
se unlawful, it is possible to argue that not all horizontal agreements
to divide territory need be per se unlawful. It would seem that it
might be possible to convince the Court to apply the rule of reason
favorably, especially where the success of a new entry or a group
of failing firms was at stake.
HENRY C. MCFADYEN
Civil Rights-Racially Discriminatory Employment
Practices Under Title VII
In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Incorporated,' the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that present
differences in departmental seniority of Negroes and whites that
resulted from the company's past and intentional racially discrim-
inatory hiring policy were unlawful employment practices in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Quarles was the
first such case to be litigated under Title VIi.
Prior to 1966, Phillip Morris employed Negroes only in one
of three departments covered by a collective bargaining agreement
with Local 203 of the Tobacco Workers International Union, the
prefabrication department." The jobs available in prefabrication
were generally lower paying and less desirable than those in either
" Cases behind the rule in White Motor, all involving firms with large
market power, are Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. National Lead Company, 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
1279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. There were also allegations of racial
discrimination in the employer's hiring practices, employment and promotion
of supervisory personnel, and the payment of wages. The court summarily
dismissed the first two issues, and found racial discrimination in the pay-
ment of wages only as to two Negro employees.
'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
'Negroes were also employed for seasonal work in another department,
but this was covered by a different collective bargaining agreement.
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the fabrication or the warehouse and shipping departments for which
whites were hired. Each department had its own job progression
ladder and seniority roster, and Phillip Morris usually hired em-
ployees for entry level positions in a department, filling higher rated
jobs by advancement based primarily on departmental seniority.
Further, the company prohibited interdepartmental transfers by
Negroes until 1961, when the collective bargaining agreement was
changed to permit a few transfers each six months. The employees
competed for the transfers on the basis of seniority, merit and
ability. Later a provision was added to allow transfers in the dis-
cretion of management, but transfers were conditioned on the loss
of departmental seniority. However, in the event of layoff, the
employee could return to his previous department with his employ-
ment date seniority unimpaired. The effect of all this was to "lock
in" the Negro employees in the less desirable jobs while whites with
no seniority in the company were hired into the better jobs off the
streets. After exhausting his administrative remedies," the plaintiff
brought this action on behalf of the Negro employees as a class who
had been hired and had continued to work under these conditions.
The Negro employees sought to be trained and promoted to fill
vacancies on the same basis as white employees with equal ability
and employment seniority.
Although racial discrimination in employment has been dealt
with previously by other measures,' Title VII of the Civil Rights
5In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967),
the court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently exhausted their administra-
tive remedies.
Title VII provides for the complainant to file with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission "within ninety days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. . . ." After investigation, if the commission
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,
the commission must attempt to eliminate any such alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. If voluntary compliance fails, the complainant has thirty days
to commence suit in the appropriate federal court. Further, upon timely
application, the court in its discretion may allow the Attorney General of
the United States to intervene if he certifies that the case is of general public
importance. Also, in certain instances the Attorney General may bring suit
on his own initiative. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5-6 (1964).
' The first attempt by the government to eliminate discrimination in
employment was in the form of an executive order issued by President Roose-
velt in 1941. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941). It prohibited
discrimination in government and defense industries. An executive order
issued by President Johnson requires that all government agencies include
a nondiscrimination clause in all of their contracts. However, contractors
[Vol. 46
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Act of 1964 represents "the first time the Congress of the United
States has declared racial discrimination in private employment un-
lawful." Following the pattern established by state fair employment
practice laws, Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice"
for any employer covered by the Act :'
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 9
Nor may an employer, on such grounds, "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee. .. ."10 Labor organizations covered
are to undertake not merely to refrain from discrimination; in addition, they
are to promise to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are em-
ployed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard
to their race, creed, color or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11246, 3
C.F.R. 167-68 (Supp. 1965). To process complaints, each President created
a Committee on Fair Employment Practices or, as it was called under Presi-
dent Kennedy, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
Many states attempted to eliminate racial discrimination in employment
by enacting state fair employment practice laws. In 1945 New York, the
first of thirty-six states to pass such a statute, established a commission
and directed it "to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment ...
because of race, creed, color, or national origin ..... " Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y.
Sess. Laws 125. Further, the statute specified a number of "unlawful em-
ployment practices." Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y. Sess. Laws 131.
The National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act have also
offered assistance in the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
Since the statutes provide for the representative union to be the exclusive
representative of the employees, a duty of fair representation has been im-
posed on the union. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Local 12, URW v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
For discussions of this duty, see Cox, The Ditty of Fair Representation, 2
VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Rosen, The Law and Discrimination in Employ-
nent, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965) ; Sovern, The National La6or Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 563 (1962).
Although Title VII is the latest and most comprehensive governmental
action for the elimination of racial discrimination, the above mentioned
methods should continue to be used to supplement it. M. SOVERN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205-13 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SovERN].
'S0VERIN 101.
'Employers covered by the Act with some exceptions include all em-
ployers "engaging in an industry affecting commerce" who have twenty-five
or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
" Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (2).
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by the act11 may not deny membership to a worker or act to deprive
him of or limit his employment opportunities or "otherwise adverse-
ly affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment" because of his race, religion, sex or national origin.12 In
addition, labor organizations cannot lawfully "cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual" in violation
of the duties imposed on the employer by Title VII.3 Finally,
employers and labor organizations may not discriminate in programs
of apprenticeship or retraining.1
4
The court apparently assumed that any racial discrimination in
employment, unless specifically condoned by the Act, would violate
Title VII, since it failed to analyze the Act's provisions as they
related to the particular facts of the case. Thus, the basic inquiry
was whether racial discrimination did in fact exist. In resolving
this question, the court closely scrutinized the plight of Negroes
hired during the period when Phillip Morris maintained its dis-
criminatory hiring policy. It noted that the Negroes, to be eligible
to compete for the better jobs, first had to transfer to either the
fabrication or warehouse and shipping department. But to transfer
they had to either compete with Negroes of greater seniority in the
prefabrication department or transfer with a loss of departmental
seniority. Upon transfer, they were at the bottom of the seniority
roster in the new department, regardless of their overall plant
seniority. In case of lay-off, they were the first to go, although
they could return to the old department with seniority accumulated
while working there. Further, the Negroes, while waiting for an
opportunity to transfer, continued to be paid less than the white
employees in other departments. On the other hand, white employees
of equal ability and equal or less company-wide tenure would already
be in the department to which the Negroes were attempting to trans-
fer. Furthermore, the whites' departmental seniority would be
greater than or at least equal to the seniority which the Negroes
could acquire if and when they were allowed to transfer. This
situation led the court to conclude that, although the restrictive
" Labor organizations covered by the Act, in general, include all unions
which represent or seek to represent employees of covered employers, and
which have twenty-five or more members. Id. at §§ 2000e(d)-(e).
"
2Id. at §§ 2000e-2(c) (1)-(2).
lId. at § 2000e-2(c) (3).
1
,Id. at § 2000e-2(d).
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Act of 1964 represents "the first time the Congress of the United
States has declared racial discrimination in private employment un-
lawful."' Following the pattern established by state fair employment
practice laws, Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice"
for any employer covered by the Act :'
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 9
Nor may an employer, on such grounds, "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee.. . ."'0 Labor organizations covered
are to undertake not merely to refrain from discrimination; in addition, they
are to promise to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are em-
ployed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard
to their race, creed, color or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11246, 3
C.F.R. 167-68 (Supp. 1965). To process complaints, each President created
a Committee on Fair Employment Practices or, as it was called under Presi-
dent Kennedy, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
Many states attempted to eliminate racial discrimination in employment
by enacting state fair employment practice laws. In 1945 New York, the
first of thirty-six states to pass such a statute, established a commission
and directed it "to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment ...
because of race, creed, color, or national origin ... ." Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y.
Sess. Laws 125. Further, the statute specified a number of "unlawful em-
ployment practices." Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y. Sess. Laws 131.
The National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act have also
offered assistance in the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
Since the statutes provide for the representative union to be the exclusive
representative of the employees, a duty of fair representation has been im-
posed on the union. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Local 12, URW v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
For discussions of this duty, see Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2
VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Rosen, The Law and Discrimination in Employ-
nent, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965) ; Sovern, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLum. L. REv. 563 (1962).
Although Title VII is the latest and most comprehensive governmental
action for the elimination of racial discrimination, the above mentioned
methods should continue to be used to supplement it. M. SOVERN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS oN RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205-13 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SOVERN].
7 SOVERN 101.
'Employers covered by the Act with some exceptions include all em-
ployers "engaging in an industry affecting commerce" who have twenty-five
or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (2).
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by the act 1 may not deny membership to a worker or act to deprive
him of or limit his employment opportunities or "otherwise adverse-
ly affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment" because of his race, religion, sex or national origin.1 2 In
addition, labor organizations cannot lawfully "cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual" in violation
of the duties imposed on the employer by Title VII.'8  Finally,
employers and labor organizations may not discriminate in programs
of apprenticeship or retraining.' 4
The court apparently assumed that any racial discrimination in
employment, unless specifically condoned by the Act, would violate
Title VII, since it failed to analyze the Act's provisions as they
related to the particular facts of the case. Thus, the basic inquiry
was whether racial discrimination did in fact exist. In resolving
this question, the court closely scrutinized the plight of Negroes
hired during the period when Phillip Morris maintained its dis-
criminatory hiring policy. It noted that the Negroes, to be eligible
to compete for the better jobs, first had to transfer to either the
fabrication or warehouse and shipping department. But to transfer
they had to either compete with Negroes of greater seniority in the
prefabrication department or transfer with a loss of departmental
seniority. Upon transfer, they were at the bottom of the seniority
roster in the new department, regardless of their overall plant
seniority. In case of lay-off, they were the first to go, although
they could return to the old department with seniority accumulated
while working there. Further, the Negroes, while waiting for an
opportunity to transfer, continued to be paid less than the white
employees in other departments. On the other hand, white employees
of equal ability and equal or less company-wide tenure would already
be in the department to which the Negroes were attempting to trans-
fer. Furthermore, the whites' departmental seniority would be
greater than or at least equal to the seniority which the Negroes
could acquire if and when they were allowed to transfer. This
situation led the court to conclude that, although the restrictive
" Labor organizations covered by the Act, in general, include all unions
which represent or seek to represent employees of covered employers, and
which have twenty-five or more members. Id. at §§ 2000e(d)-(e).
'Id. at 88 2000e-2(c)(1)-(2).
I31d. at § 2000e-2(c) (3).
"Id. at § 2000e-2(d).
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transfer provisions were now being administered on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis and Phillip Morris was no longer discriminating in
its hiring in any department as of 1966, the restrictive transfer
provisions continued to perpetuate the past discrimination and
amounted to present discrimination in violation of Title VII. 5
NLRB v. Local 267, IBEW, 6 which was litigated under the
National Labor Relations Act, supports the premise that past dis-
crimination can not be perpetrated by continued use of an employ-
ment practice even though it is not itself discriminatory on its face.
There the union had maintained a hiring hall and in the past had
preferred union members to nonmembers for work referrals. Fur-
ther, priority in referral had been and continued to be based
upon past employment. The court reasoned that, although section
8(f) (4) of the NLRA specifically sanctioned priority based on
experience, the subsection did not sanction "the use of seemingly
objective criteria as a guise for achieving illegal discrimination."'17
The congressional hearings and debates do not lend substantial
support to either the court's viewpoint or a contrary position.:,
Congress never discussed departmental seniority, which was in-
volved in Quarles. But the legislators did state that Title VII would
not affect established employment seniority rights, i.e., since the
Act was "prospective and not retrospective,"' 9 it would not require
subsequently hired Negroes to be preferred on the basis of race over
previously hired whites. 20  In fact, section 703(j)21 specifically
barred this "reverse discrimination." At any rate, the court appears
correct in concluding that congressional debate did not significantly
weaken its position.
279 F. Supp. at 518, 19.
'a357 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1966).17 Id. at 57.
" See, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CML RIGHTS Act of 1964
(1964); Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro,
80 HARV. L. Rv. 1260 (1967). The court acknowledged that it relied
heavily on this note.
"o 110 CONG. Rxc. 6992 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
It should be noted that, although a finding of discrimination would not
cause the Act to apply retroactively, the court's remedy could still be retro-
active. For a discussion of this and the remedy in Quarles, see note 29 infra.
"0 QuarIes does not require any change of employment seniority. It only
requires that Negro employees transferring to other departments compete
with white employees on the basis of their length of time in the company's
employment, i.e., on the basis of employment seniority, rather than on the
basis of their length of time in that department.242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
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Although the congressional discussion alone is not very instruc-
tive as to what effect Title VII was intended to have on pre-existing
deparimental seniority rights, a proviso to section 703 which was
added as an amendment has some bearing on this determination.
In particular, section 703(h)22 states that, notwithstanding other
provisions of Title VII, an employer may:
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority... system ... provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race .... 23
It has been suggested that this proviso, read in light of the con-
gressional discussion, "reflects a congressional consensus favoring
the protection of all seniority rights existing before Title VII's
effective date."'24 But, however one reads the proviso,
it does not seem possible to interpret it as providing a blanket
exemption for all differences in treatment resulting from seniority
arrangements set up before Title VII came into force. The
proviso does not expressly refer to such preexisting systems, but
to all "bona fide" systems. A "bona fide" seniority system seems
to be one which can be explained or justified on nonracial
grounds.2 5
Whitfield v. United Steelworkers,26 decided prior to passage of
Title VII, is the only case either before or after the passage of
Title VII in which there were similar facts. Phillip Morris and
Local 203 relied heavily on Whitfield, which held that there was no
discrimination even though the Negro employees with greater
seniority had to go to the bottom when they transferred depart-
ments.2 7 However, the court in Quarles distinguished Whitfield
on the grounds that the skills obtained in the departmental pro-
"This was one of a series of amendments negotiated to gain the support
of a group of Senators headed by Senator Dirksen against the filibuster
conducted by southern opponents of the Civil Rights Act. Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 431, 449 (1966).2342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
"2 Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 at 1272; accord, Note, The Civil Rights Act of
1964: Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 41 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 58,
78 (1966).
2; Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Iocumbent Negro,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 at 1272.28263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
7 Id. at 551.
[Vol. 46
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gression were necessary for advancement to higher level jobs.28 In
Quarles, the only skills required, if any, were those that each em-
ployee, whether white or Negro, had to acquire on the particular job
or through training just prior to taking the job.
Under Title VII, the court must find that "the respondent has
intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice"
before it can enjoin the practice and "order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate .... -2' The court concluded that *Phillip
Morris and Local 203 had intentionally engaged in unlawful em-
ployment practices by discriminating on the grounds of race with-
out discussing what was necessary to constitute the requisite intent.
The court did state that the defendants' pre-Title VII hiring prac-
tices were intentionally discriminatory and this conclusion appears
to be justified by the evidence."0 However, surely the court did
not intend that this should suffice as the neccessary intent, because
such an interpretation would seem susceptible to the objection of
retroactivity. In fact, it appears difficult to allege realistically that
the condemned practices by themselves were intentionally dis-
8 279 F. Supp. at 518.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
In fashioning a remedy which would award the complainants "affirmative
relief," the court had two basic choices which have been referred to as the
"rightful place" remedy and the "freedom now" remedy. 80 HA-Rv. L. REv.
at 1268. The "rightful place" remedy
would allow an incumbent Negro to bid for openings in "white" jobs
comparable to those held by whites of equal tenure, on the basis of his
full length of service with the employer. If he met the existing ability
requirements for such a job, he would be entitled to fill it, without
regard to the seniority expectations of junior white employees. The
"rightful place" approach requires an adjustment in competitive stand-
ing with regard to future job movements arising in the ordinary
course of an employer's business.
Id. In contrast, the "freedom now" remedy would displace whites for Ne-
groes who would have had the job if there had not been originally a dis-
criminatory hiring policy. The court, after considering the merits of the
efficiencies obtained through the company's present departmental organization
and the economic losses to the Negro employees, awarded a variation of the
"rightful place" remedy. Any lesser relief, e.g., allowing Negroes to transfer
to entry level positions in the other departments when vacancies occurred,
would have continued to subordinate the Negroes to the white employees.
The "freedom now" approach insofar as it would reverse job awards made
before Title VII became law "seems vulnerable to the charge that it is
retroactive," although this is only one of many reasons why this remedy
does not seem viable.
For an example of a pre-Title VII remedy similar to that in Quarls,
see Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
o279 F. Supp. 518.
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criminatory. It was never contended that the restrictive transfer
policies were conjured up to defeat the intent of Title VII, and,
in fact, this arrangement had been in effect previously. Further,
the court recognized that the departmental system in combination
with the restrictive transfer system had offered the company many
legitimate benefits. 3 However, in support of the court's decision,
it seems that discriminatory intent can be inferred from the em-
ployer's continued use of its restrictive transfer system, since the
employer must have known that the practical effect would be to dis-
criminate against senior Negro employees in the prefabrication de-
partment.1
2
Although Quarles appears to be consistent with the overall in-
tent of Title VIIy3 in the absence of clarifying congressional
amendment, the continued use of Title VII for the elimination of
present differences in seniority caused by prior racial discrimination
in hiring will raise three problems-whether such differences are
in fact discriminatory; what is required to establish the requisite
intent; and what effect qualifications of skill and ability have on
the issues of intent and discrimination.
It seems that an argument equally meritorious to that of the
court in Quarles can be made to the effect that, if an employer has
discontinued his racially discriminatory practices, there is no pres-
ent discrimination although vestiges of the old system remain in the
form of differences in seniority. 4 Further, assuming no present
intent can be found, it can be argued that Quarles applies the act
retroactively.
Convincingly showing the necessary intent is the second major
obstacle in upholding the Quarles interpretation. If a court requires
a demonstration of a particular state of mind, the burden of proof
could be almost insurmountable. On the other hand, if the court
reasons that the parties intended the natural and probable conse-
quences of their actions, the problem will be less significant8 5
Finally, although qualification requirements for promotion were
811 Id. at 513.
'See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination by
Labor Unions, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58, 77 (1966).
"
3 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at
160 (1964).
" This was the position of the defendants in Quarles.
Co See Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. IND. &
Cob. L. REV. 473, 479-80 (1966).
[Vol. 46
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not in issue in Quarles, they will be an important factor in many
future cases.86 The easiest situation is where an employer's qualifi-
cation requirements are only a facade. In such instances, upon a
showing of sufficient evidence, the court will probably consider this
only as evidence of the company's intention to discriminate. An-
other situation is like that in Quarles where the company maintains
a training program to qualify employees for higher level positions.
Title VII specifically states that such training programs will be ad-
ministered without discrimination.37 The most difficult type case
arose in Whitfield, where the qualification requirements were legiti-
mate and the white employees obtained the skills by progression
through the department. 8 The court in Quarles implied that Title
VII would not damage the Whitfield finding of no discrimination. 9
However, it can be contended that, although the Negro employees
would have to go to the bottom of the department to obtain the
necessary skills, they should not lose their seniority as they did in
Whitfield. This would allow the Negroes to progress as quickly
as they grasped the required skills for advancement and as soon as
vacancies for which they were qualified came open. In Whitfield,
the court emphasized the good faith of the union in fairly represent-
ing all the employees.4" Under Title VII, it appears that the elimina-
tion of seniority rights upon transfer, whether the employee has to
obtain skills or not, would continue to perpetuate the past discrimina-
tion and, therefore, under Quarles should be in violation of the Act.
Although employers and unions may be faced with practical
problems in complying with Title VII as interpreted in Quarles,
Congress expressed its intention to eliminate racial discrimination
in employment and, because of the magnitude of the evil to be
eliminated, did not provide for any balancing of interests. Quarles
is consistent with this general purpose of Title VII, but the court
could have augmented the significance of its decision by analyzing
the pertinent provisions of the Act and pointing out which facts
demonstrated a violation of which provisions.
WILLIAm H. LEwis, JR.
8 Id. at 476-8.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1964).
"263 F.2d at 550.
°279 F. Supp. at 518.
,4 263 F.2d at 551.
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